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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the equity aspects of international burden sharing for global CO2 
emission stabilization. It first summarizes and classifies five equity principles that may 
play a role in allocating emission entitlements to countries. These principles are then 
used to examine ten burden-sharing rules – proposed in the published literature of the 
field – by analyzing the degree to which each rule incorporates the five equity 
principles. 
The burden-sharing rules surveyed are not readily comparable because they do not use a 
common global emission (reduction) goal. For that reason, our paper carries out a 
detailed examination of three sets of quantitative emission entitlements, which are based 
on three typical burden-sharing rules – the equal emissions per capita approach, the 
carbon intensity approach, and the Triptych approach – with the idea of comparing their 
implications for carbon emission entitlements for 67 countries and 9 world regions. To 
make the three rules comparable, we used a global carbon emission target that leads 
asymptotically to an atmospheric CO2 concentration of 550 ppmv.  
Reducing carbon emissions to meet this concentration target requires significant global 
efforts. No burden-sharing scheme aiming at this target can therefore be expected to 
lead to a negligible burden on all countries. Depending on the equity principle chosen, a 
scheme can allocate more of the global burden to developing countries or to 
industrialized countries. Developing countries receive relatively higher entitlements 
under the equal emissions per capita approach whereas industrialized countries are 
relatively better off under the carbon intensity approach. The Triptych approach leads to 
in-between allocations for most countries. Only countries with high carbon intensity in 
1990 (for example China, Russia, and Poland) receive the highest entitlements under 
this burden-sharing rule.  
In some countries and regions, emission entitlements as calculated by any of the three 
burden-sharing rules are so tight that it appears unrealistic to assume that domestic 
measures alone can be successful in limiting their actual emissions to the emission 
entitlements assigned to them. It would therefore seem natural to assume that the 
calculated entitlements determine the initial allocation of tradable emission allowances 
of countries or regions. Although we make this assumption, we considered any 
numerical determination of carbon trade flows to be outside the scope of our paper. 
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 1
Burden-sharing rules for stabilizing greenhouse-gas 
concentrations and their equity implications 
1 Introduction  
Equity and fairness play an important role in international negotiations and agreements. 
This is particularly the case with the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in which the equity issue is explicitly addressed.  In the 
Principles (Article 3) it is stated that, “on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, parties 
should act to protect the climate system. This formulation was the basis for exempting 
developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol from the obligation to reduce emissions. 
However, the eventual success of the UNFCCC will also depend on the active 
participation of developing countries whose representatives have already made it clear 
that equity will become a key issue in any such negotiations. 
The Kyoto Protocol adopted the so-called target and time table approach, which sets 
specific goals in terms of emission targets at given points in time. At the core of this 
approach are so-called burden-sharing rules, which can be used to determine the 
allocation of the emission entitlements of the Parties to the UNFCCC.   
In this paper we focus on the relation between equity principles, burden-sharing rules, 
and emission entitlements.  The paper sets out to analyze how different equity concepts 
presented by different authors can relate to burden-sharing rules proposed in the 
relevant literature.  We carry out this analysis first in a qualitative way by assessing ten 
popular burden-sharing rules from the perspective of five equity principles that have 
been argued to be relevant for the task. 
We then examine three particularly typical and popular representatives of the ten 
burden-sharing rules (the equal emissions per capita approach, the carbon intensity 
approach, and a modified Triptych approach) in a unified frame. In other words, we use 
these rules to calculate emission entitlements for 67 selected countries (and the “Rest of 
the World”) that add up to a global trajectory leading to an asymptotic atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentration of 550 parts per million in volume (ppmv). We then assess 
the equity aspects of these three rules in terms of three representative indicators, one 
reflecting equal rights to emit, and two reflecting equal efforts to mitigate.  Note that the 
actual carbon emissions may be different from the allocated emission entitlements if 
international carbon-emission trading or other kinds of flexibility, such as joint 
implementation and the clean-development mechanism, are allowed.  We assess the 
equitability of the burden-sharing rules in terms of the allocated emission entitlements, 
not the actual emissions after the international carbon trading.   
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Of course, equity is not the only criterion that will be decisive for the success or failure 
of entitlement schemes; political feasibility will also play a crucial role. Although in this 
paper we do not address politics, we hope that our analysis of the relation between 
equity principles and quantitative commitments will facilitate assessment of the political 
acceptability both of the equity principles themselves and any mitigation commitments 
in which they may result. 
Note: Throughout this paper, “tons” always means metric tons (megagrams). 
2 Equity Principles 
In this section, we summarize equity concepts that have been invoked by other authors 
as being relevant in the context of global climate change. If one studies the relevant 
publications in the field, it quickly becomes clear that equity is a multifaceted concept. 
An assessment of how equitable a rule is must therefore be multidimensional, and it is 
thus obvious that burden-sharing rules cannot be ranked according to how well they 
represent equity.   
In our review of equity principles we follow Rose and Stevens (1993) who distinguish 
between “allocation-based” and “outcome-based” equity principles. Allocation-based 
equity principles deal with fairness in terms of allocations of property rights, or 
emission entitlements to countries. Outcome-based equity principles involve fairness in 
sharing welfare changes in the sense of traditional welfare economics. Welfare changes 
are often approximated by a loss or gain in GDP.  
In their analysis of the interplay between equity and efficiency, Bosello et al. (2001) 
restrict themselves to analyzing the cost allocation of abatement. They can argue 
therefore that allocation-based equity principles are implemented with reference to 
abatement cost, whereas outcome-based equity principles require the specification of 
welfare function for each country.  In this paper, we also include the possibility of 
allocating entitlements, thus this characterization is not possible. 
Rose et al. (1998) note that the allocation stage is more immediate and more certain than 
the outcome, and hence might receive more attention. In contrast to allocation-based 
equity concepts, outcome-based equity principles are applied in an ex post manner 
because a model – or an equivalent tool – is needed to calculate the numerical 
implication of the rules for welfare changes. 
Table 1 summarizes five equity principles and their relation to the definition of burden-
sharing rules in the global climate policy context. The reader is referred to Rose (1992) 
for a discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of each of the principles. In the 
following subsections, we will discuss these five equity principles in detail.   
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Table 1: Five equity principles used in the literature and their implications for global 
burden-sharing. 
Equity principles Implication for burden sharing in the context of global climate protection  
Allocation-based principles 
Egalitarian Supports equal emission rights per capita 
Polluter Pays Supports historical responsibility 
Sovereignty  Supports the status quo 
Outcome-based principles 
Horizontal equity Supports allowance according to countries’ specific circumstances 
(explained in the text below); supporting equal distribution of cost 
Vertical equity Supports differentiation between rich and poor by considering “ability to 
pay” 
 
2.1 Allocation-based principles  
The egalitarian equity principle is defined as equal rights for all human beings 
irrespective of their socioeconomic status (Rose, 1992). Rose et al. (1998) define it in 
terms of all people having an equal right to pollute and to be protected from pollution. 
For greenhouse-gas-emission (GHG) entitlements, this would mean that each person 
would have right to emit in equal amounts.  
The polluter pays principle was formally adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in 1974 in the context of international 
environmental policy. It stipulates that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying 
out measures of pollution prevention and control to restore the status of the environment 
before the pollution occurred (OECD, 1974). In the context of climate change, this 
implies that the abatement burden should be distributed according to the level of 
emissions. The inclusion of past emissions – to the extent that they are the cause of 
present atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations – leads to the “historical-
responsibility” argument. This is a crucial argument for developing countries because, 
as Rose (1992) notes, “ignoring the past build-up and simply basing reduction 
requirements on subsequent emissions would be equivalent to penalizing developing 
countries for their progress, when no such sanction was imposed on industrialized 
countries.” A counterargument to the historical-responsibility concept is that no one 
should be held responsible for consequences that were not foreseen at the time an action 
was undertaken (Rowlands, 1997).  
Rose et al. (1998) use the term sovereignty in connection with the argument that all 
nations have an equal right to pollute and to be protected from pollution. In the climate 
change context, sovereignty is often invoked to support the grandfathering approach of 
distributing the reduction commitment in proportion to actual emissions. It seems to us 
however, that an additional argument, i. e., that a country’s right to emit is “legitimized” 
by past usage and custom (Rose, 1992), is needed so that the status quo may be 
considered as an inherited right, in pursuance of the sovereignty principle. Moreover, as 
sovereignty usually refers to the political concept of noninterference, we shall avoid 
using the term as an equity principle. Rather, we will follow Blanchard et al., (2001) 
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and use the term proportional equality as an equity-related principle that supports 
grandfathering.1  
2.2 Outcome-based principles 
Whereas allocation-based equity concepts deal with the distribution of emission 
entitlements from the perspective of property-right distribution, outcome-based equity 
concepts address them from the perspective of distributing cost or, more generally, 
welfare loss. Unless emission entitlements are allocated retroactively, the assessment of 
cost usually involves the use of a model.  
Horizontal and vertical equity are two examples of outcome-based principles. They are 
defined in terms of how net welfare losses and benefits are distributed among countries, 
and they differ in that the rich pay more, either in absolute terms or proportionally. 
Generally speaking, net welfare is measured using a welfare function, but given the 
hypothetical nature of such a function, the net gain (or loss) of GDP is usually used as 
an approximation. 
The meaning of horizontal and vertical equity is similar to their meaning in relation to 
tax policy (Cazorla and Toman, 2000). Horizontal equity postulates that each entity, in 
this case a country, is to be treated equally with respect to the specific relative welfare 
change (measured, for example, as loss of national income as a proportion of GDP). 
Progressive income taxation is a familiar example of the application of vertical equity. 
Vertical equity is related to the ability to pay and affordability, and therefore postulates 
that a higher cost2 (per capita) is to be carried by richer counties.  
Ringius et al. (1998) argue that the UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate reflect the 
horizontal-equity principle. Their arguments are based on UNFCCC, Article 4.8, which 
aims at an equalization of welfare losses by emphasizing the need to pay attention to 
specific situations of countries and their sources of income. The Berlin Mandate, in 
Article 2(a), underlines that the individual circumstances of developed countries and the 
differences in their starting points should be taken into account when strengthening 
commitments to reduce GHG emissions. 
At the same time, the differentiation of the burden between developed and developing 
nations reflects the vertical-equity concept. The Kyoto Protocol thus reflects elements of 
vertical as well as horizontal equity. 
                                               
1
 Blanchard et al., (2001) describe proportional equality as the idea of justice defined by Aristotle, 
namely, that people are unequal and are therefore treated unequally. According to that idea, social 
position is the factor that structures distribution and it is considered to be the only criterion for comparing 
individuals, since the function occupied by an individual in society is supposed to correspond to the value 
of his work for that society. 
2
 Note that here we say “cost” and not “welfare loss” because welfare loss could be defined as utility of 
consumption, often defined logarithmically, which implies declining marginal utility of consumption. 
Equal loss of utility of consumption would then automatically reflect vertical equity. 
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3 Burden-sharing Rules and their Assessment from an Equity 
Perspective 
Burden-sharing rules determine the amount of allocated emission entitlements as a 
function of some quantitative variables, the most popular of these being population and 
GDP. Here, we assess the alternative burden-sharing rules with respect to their equity 
implications. 
Our assessment covers ten burden-sharing rules found in the published literature. To 
structure the rules, we use the common distinction between reductive and distributive 
rules. According to this distinction, reductive rules distribute global reductions among 
countries. In contrast, distributive rules distribute global GHG emission entitlements 
among countries (Grübler and Nakićenović, 1994).  
3.1 Reductive rules 
In general, reductive rules are less acceptable to countries that have not yet reached a 
mature level of economic development as emission reductions are likely to limit their 
growth aspirations. Given the vast disparity today in the status of economic 
development between developing and developed countries, the implementation of 
reductive rules would not appear to be consistent with the “development” part of the 
concept of sustainable development. Reductive rules that assign emission reductions to 
developing countries are thus likely to be in conflict not only with both the horizontal- 
and vertical-equity concept but also with the historical-responsibility concept. Not 
surprisingly, the application of the reduction-based rules is less controversial in 
developed countries.   
3.1.1 Grandfathering  
The grandfathering approach is one of the simplest approaches to burden sharing. It 
refers to a flat-rate reduction of emissions at a given point in the past, that is, a 
percentage cut of the kind specified in the Kyoto Protocol.  According to Merriam-
Webster (1997), a grandfather clause is a “clause creating an exemption based on 
circumstances previously existing”, especially “a provision in several southern-state 
constitutions designed to enfranchise poor whites and disenfranchise Negroes by 
waiving high voting requirements for descendants of men voting before 1867”. This 
inequitable historical meaning notwithstanding, the grandfathering approach has played 
a dominant role in the climate policy debate.  
As we have argued above, we want to use the term proportional equality as supporting 
the grandfathering approach. We note that, in practice, proportional equality tends to 
contradict egalitarian equity, not only because it penalizes countries with higher 
population growth, but also because it tends to perpetuate any existing inequities. It is 
also inconsistent with the polluter pays equity principle, by not reflecting the historical 
responsibility for GHG emissions. 
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3.1.2 Converging carbon intensity of GDP 
Rowlands (1997) presents an approach based on converging carbon intensity of GDP 
(carbon emissions per unit of GDP) which is used as an indicator of efficiency (the 
lower the carbon intensity of an economy, the higher its efficiency). The idea is that 
more stringent emission reductions should be prescribed for economies where actual 
efficiency is low. Rowlands’ calculations of emission entitlements therefore mandate 
initial reductions for economies with the highest carbon intensity of GDP. Emission 
reductions are mandated until the country’s carbon intensity of GDP equals that of the 
country with the next lowest score.  
The converging-carbon-intensity-of-GDP approach thus reflects horizontal equity 
because countries with higher carbon intensity – which would be required to reduce a 
higher percentage of their emissions – can be expected to be able to achieve carbon 
emission reduction relatively easily as there are still larger opportunities to implement 
technological improvements. Note that this reasoning therefore also appeals to 
efficiency arguments. It is at odds, however, with the principle of vertical equity 
because it puts a heavy economic burden on less-developed nations because of their 
higher carbon intensity compared to that of most industrial economies.  
3.1.3 The efficiency index approach 
Gupta and Bhandari (1999) favor an equal emissions per capita approach for all 
countries in the long run. To avoid prescribing abruptly declining emission entitlements 
for Annex I countries, the authors suggested that the efficiency index approach should be 
applicable to these countries during a transition period.  
Their approach in a sense combines the first two approaches summarized here by 
amending the grandfathering approach (equal percentage reduction) to include cost-
efficiency. The latter is reflected in the special allowances given to countries that have 
achieved high efficiency, defined as low carbon intensity of GDP. The authors argue 
that an efficient economy, assuming it already uses relatively GHG-benign 
technologies, should not be punished for the efficiency that it achieved in the past.  An 
additional rationale for these extra allowances is that economies with lower efficiencies 
can be expected to have lower marginal abatement costs. Therefore, the following 
adjustment is suggested to determine the percentage reduction for a country.  
A country’s percentage reductiontime = total percentage reductiontime * efficiency index    (Eq. 1) 
Efficiency indexcountry = (CO2 emissionscountry, 1990/GDP country, 1990) / 
                                        (CO2 emission Annex I, t)/GDP Annex I, t)                                         (Eq. 2) 
The efficiency index is thus defined as the carbon intensity of a country, divided by the 
average carbon intensity of Annex I countries. The efficiency index for a country is 
assumed time-dependent through its linkage to the average carbon intensity of Annex I 
countries, which is assumed to decrease at an annual rate of 0.8%. 
The overall thrust of Gupta and Bhandari (1999) is the equal emissions per capita rule, 
thus reflecting egalitarian equity. Only during a transition period and only for Annex I 
countries, they propose reliance on reductions in proportion to base-year emissions, thus 
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reflecting proportional equality. These reductions are corrected using carbon efficiency 
as a determinant, reflecting the account taken of horizontal equity. 
3.1.4 The multicriteria approach 
Ringius et al. (1998) proposed three formulae and a set of six indicators (population, 
CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions per GDP, CO2 emission per capita, GDP, and GDP per 
capita) to calculate emission reduction targets for OECD countries. Each formula is 
designed to allocate greater emission reduction, relative to the reference year, to those 
countries that exceed the OECD average with respect to the indicators included in the 
formulae. The authors do not give preference to any of the three formulae. Each formula 
is thus one variant and could therefore be regarded as a “subapproach”. 
Formula I defines emission reduction for each country as a percentage of emissions in a 
reference year.  The formula includes the following indicators: CO2 emission per capita 
(A), GDP (B), emissions per unit of GDP (C), and GDP per capita (D).  These are 
understood as indicators for emission entitlements, size of countries, energy efficiency, 
and ability to pay.   
Formula I is defined as follows  
 



⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅⋅=
D
D
w
C
C
w
B
B
w
A
A
wX iD
i
C
i
B
i
Ai α
(Eq. 3)
The resulting Xi is the percentage reduction for country i. The parameter α is a scaling 
factor, determined such that the total emission reductions by countries become equal to 
the OECD target. The parameters A to D (without subscript) are OECD averages of the 
respective indicator. wA to wD are the weights that add up to 1. The authors do not 
propose numerical values for the weight of each indicator, therefore opening them up 
for possible negotiation.  
Formula II calculates, in absolute terms, the contribution Yi of country i in the total 
emission reduction of the OECD. Countries with a larger population, higher CO2 
emissions, and higher GDP are prescribed a higher CO2 reduction. 
Formula II is defined as follows,  
 
( )iGiFiEi GwFwEwY ⋅+⋅+⋅=
 
(Eq. 4)
where Ei is a country’s percentage share of population of the OECD total, Fi is a 
country’s share of CO2 emissions  in the base year, and Gi is a country’s share of GDP. 
The three weights wE, wF, and wG are again left unspecified. 
Formula III includes GDP (B), emissions per unit of GDP (C), and GDP per capita (D).  
 ( )
( )∑ ⋅+⋅+⋅
⋅+⋅+⋅
=
j
jDjCjB
iDiCiB
i DwCwBw
DwCwBw
Z
 
(Eq. 5)
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As in Formula II, Zi is the percentage share of country i of the total emission reduction 
commitment for the OECD. Again, the weights are left unspecified.  
The multicriteria approach tries to address several equity principles at the same time by 
combining a subset of the six indicators in their formulae. CO2 emissions per capita can 
be considered to represent egalitarian equity; GDP per capita addresses vertical equity; 
emissions per GDP reflect horizontal equity; and CO2 emission in a base year reflects 
proportional equality. The authors do not give a reason for including total GDP as a 
factor. They merely note that total GDP represents the size of economy. From this we 
conclude that Ringius et al. (1998) want to provide a place in their approach for those 
who think that size of economy can play a role in determining an equitable allocation of 
emissions. Presumably, the concept of economy of scale can be used to estimate the size 
of the influence that total GDP has on the cost of mitigation. 
The multicriteria approach is thus characterized by a high degree of flexibility. As 
Phylipsen et al. (1998) note, however, introducing so many indicators together with 
parameters used for weighting them will increase the risk of losing transparency.  
3.1.5 Cutbacks proportional to past contributions  
According to the logic of differentiated responsibility, the cutbacks proportional to past 
contributions approach suggests that the emission reduction targets of each country are 
in direct proportion to that country’s share in the total anthropogenic addition to 
preindustrial levels of atmospheric GHG concentrations. Grübler and Nakićenović 
(1994) calculated the historical contributions of world regions to  total CO2 
concentrations. Their assessment is based on an analysis using the so-called Parametric 
Framework (Grübler and Fujii, 1991), and includes anthropogenic emissions since 
1800.  
This approach is based on polluter pays equity and on proportional equality, with the 
emphasis on the former. By using past contributions, this approach directly addresses 
historical responsibility but uses the status quo as a counterbalance, giving some weight 
to the argument that the responsibility for polluting should be restricted to the time after 
which evidence of a negative impact was scientifically substantiated.  
3.2 Distributive rules 
In contrast to reductive rules, distributive rules allow increases as well as decreases in 
emission entitlements relative to a base year. Distributive rules are therefore more 
flexible than reductive rules, and do not mandate reductions in countries with low 
emissions in the base year. This suggests that distributive burden-sharing rules are likely 
to be favored by developing countries because they can more easily accommodate their 
aspiration for economic growth.  
3.2.1 Equal emissions per capita 
Allowing equal emissions per capita has an obvious appeal to equity, and burden-
sharing rules that incorporate this principle are therefore popular. Grübler and 
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Nakićenović (1994) used this rule to calculate the distribution of the global emission 
entitlements of 13 world regions with a target of 38% reduction in CO2 emissions in 
2050 compared to 1988 (equivalent to a reduction to 4 GtC in 2050). The year 2050 was 
also the target year for the convergence of the per capita emission entitlements.  
Gupta and Bhandari (1999) calculated emission allowances for Annex I countries and 
non-Annex I countries based on equal emission entitlements per capita. For each year, 
the amount of globally allowable emissions3 is divided by the global population in that 
year to determine the average per capita emissions, which is then multiplied by a 
country’s population to obtain the emission allowance for that country. 
Allowing equal emissions per capita is a direct application of egalitarian equity. Given 
the present distribution of carbon emissions to developed and developing regions, this 
approach clearly reflects vertical equity (ability to pay) because the wealthy regions are 
required to carry out more  reductions  while many poorer regions might not be required 
to reduce their emissions at all.  
Sometimes it is argued that an entitlement that is defined per head of actual population 
(rather than population in a given base year) might provide an incentive for population 
increase, particularly in developing countries. Against this, Gupta and Bhandari (1999) 
argue that it would be rather implausible to assume that this “incentive” would carry 
more weight than policies to limit population and alleviate poverty, or the recognition 
that there are limits to the availability of resources.4  
3.2.2 The Triptych approach 
The Triptych approach, proposed by Phylipsen et al. (1998), has this name because it 
calculates emission entitlements in three sectors. Somewhat resembling the multicriteria 
approach (described in Subsection 3.1.4 above) the rather sophisticated Triptych 
approach takes into account the different circumstances of individual countries by 
specifying separate national emission targets for the power sector, internationally 
oriented heavy industry, and a “domestic” sector. The approach has contributed 
significantly to the discussions of emission limits distribution within the European 
Union (EU), as follows.  
The GHG emission target for the power-producing sector is calculated from a 
hypothetical common limit to the growth of total electricity production (1%/year) with 
some extra allowance given to less-wealthy countries (i.e., the “cohesion” countries; 
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) and from individual targets on shares of electricity 
production from different technologies.  
                                               
3
 The global allowable emission path was taken as the IPCC’s WRE (Wigley, Reilly and Edmonds) 550 
ppvm stabilization scenario, which covers a time span from 1990 to 2150.   
4
 As a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation, one may want to consider the “productivity” of an additional 
person in terms of additional carbon emission entitlements for a country. With the numbers used below, 
this would be approximately one tonne of carbon per year. Subtracting from this the actual emissions of 
the hypothetical person and multiplying this by the carbon price gives an idea of the size of the extra 
incentive for one birth. Even if this number is positive, it is hard to imagine that it can be big enough to 
matter in practice. 
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Differences between countries are taken into consideration by setting country-specific 
carbon emission intensity (carbon emission per electricity output) targets defined as the 
result of a hypothetical fuel mix target and electricity conversion efficiency targets of 
fuels.  The fuel mix target is calculated using the following hypotheses, which are 
defined for the year 2015 and relative to the base year, i.e., (i) 30% reduction of fossil-
generated electricity; (ii) an 8% additional share (for example, 10.8% up from 10%) of 
renewables in total electricity generation; (iii) electricity generated by combined heat 
and power (CHP) to increase by 15%; and (iv) nuclear power does not increase its 
share. The remaining electricity is to be produced by natural gas.  
The allowance of GHG emissions  for  internationally oriented heavy (energy-intensive) 
industry is calculated based on a common target regarding energy efficiency 
improvement and growth of activity (with extra allowances for the above-mentioned 
“cohesion” countries). Finally, the targets for an aggregate of all other industries (light 
industries) and residential, commercial, transportation and agriculture sectors (termed 
the “domestic sector” in the original publication) are specified so that emissions per 
capita converge at one point in the future (e.g., in 2030). Countries in particularly cold 
or hot areas will receive extra allowances that take into consideration the higher demand 
for space heating or cooling. 
The total allowance for each country is the sum of the three sectoral allowances. A 
comparison of the resulting GHG allowance targets calculated for EU countries shows 
that the Triptych approach allows emission growth in selected countries, while avoiding 
extreme reduction targets for any country. 
Groenenberg et al. (2001) applied the same method in a wider geographical context, that 
is, to a selection of 48 developing and industrialized countries. The differentiation rule 
applied there was slightly modified from the one applied to the European Union in 
Phylipsen et al. (1998). For example, Groenenberg et al. (2001) did not take into 
account information on national policies regarding the fuel mix in the country’s power 
generation system. Structural changes within the energy-intensive sector were taken into 
account by differentiated growth rates for various industrial subsectors. Unlike 
Phylipsen et al. (1998), who calculated the criteria (and sectoral targets for each 
country) so that the total national targets added up to meet an overall emission reduction 
objective, Groenenberg et al. (2001) let the total reduction in CO2 emissions result from 
the criteria applied, not vice versa.  
By considering a large number of specific circumstances, in particular by attempting to 
avoid “windfall” advantages as well as unjustified hardship in each country, the 
Triptych approach addresses the horizontal-equity principle in a comprehensive way. 
Such an effort to achieve horizontal equity may be regarded sufficient for an equitable 
and politically acceptable scheme if the approach is applied just to European countries 
which do not vary too much in terms of their per capita income. An extension to 
developing countries that aims simultaneously for equity and acceptability would 
therefore appear to be bound additionally to consider aspects of vertical equity if it is 
intended to remain within the spirit of the original approach.   
One possible drawback of the Triptych approach could be its data intensity which arises 
from the necessity of specifying many country-specific parameters involved in the 
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calculation of allowance adjustments. This may also infringe on the transparency of the 
approach and may thus complicate the political negotiation on the rule.  
3.2.3 Historical responsibility 
The historical-responsibility approach, also known as the Brazilian approach, specifies 
that each country receives a burden that corresponds to its past contribution to climate 
change (UNFCCC, 1997). Unlike the cutbacks-proportional-to-past-contributions 
approach described above, the Brazilian approach proposes using “effective emissions” 
as a measure of the responsibility. Effective emissions are measured in terms of their 
calculated contribution to the global temperature increase relative to preindustrial levels. 
The name, effective emissions, is designed to express that the concept takes into 
account the initial concentrations of GHGs in 1990, due to previous emissions, to 
explain the historical responsibility. It also takes into account GHG sinks.  
To give an idea of the quantitative implications of their proposal, the authors calculated 
emission entitlements assuming a maximum permissible temperature increase by using 
a simple box-diffusion model based on the Second Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  
The historical-responsibility approach is the direct application of the polluter pays 
equity. 
3.2.4 Equal per capita emissions throughout the generations  
Fujii (1990) proposed equal emission entitlements per capita throughout the 
generations, an approach that allocates an equal emission allowance for each person 
irrespective not only of geographical location but also of the generation the person 
belongs to. The uniqueness of this approach is that it includes past and future 
generations (i.e., people born between 1800 and 2100). The author calculated a per 
capita emission allowance of 1.37 tC/year, assuming that the CO2 concentration level is 
allowed to rise from 280 to 560 ppmv by 2100. 
This approach is based on an expanded egalitarian equity. It addresses intergenerational 
equity, which, so far, we have not discussed here.  
3.2.5 Multisector convergence  
The Centre for International Climate and  Environmental Research (CICERO) and the 
Energy research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) have proposed the multisector 
convergence approach, in which seven different sectors have been  distinguished 
(Jansen et al., 2001). This approach sets the global averages of CO2 emission per capita 
for each sector, and commitments are made only for those countries that exceed the 
global averages.  Those countries must reduce CO2 emission per capita by the 
convergence year to the global average of the sectors.  Countries’ emission entitlements 
are calculated based on the sum of the countries’ reduction targets for the seven sectors.  
It is also proposed to include special allowances in calculating sectoral targets for each 
country. 
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4 Quantitative Analysis of National Emission Entitlements 
Calculated under Three Selected Burden-sharing Rules 
Although not reported here, all the studies reviewed in Section 3 give quantitative 
examples of the distribution of the entitlements in the original papers (a summary of the 
emission allocation calculated in the original papers are provided in Klaassen et al., 
2002).  Their results were not comparable, however, because calculations were usually 
done for a single rule and based on different assumptions. Moreover, numerical results 
reported by different authors are not always globally comprehensive mainly because, in 
general, they do not necessarily add up to one and the same total global emission limit.   
In this section, we present the emission entitlements that we calculated using three 
selected burden-sharing rules, one and the same global emission target, and a consistent 
set of assumptions with respect to population growth, GDP growth, structural change of 
economies, growth of electricity production and others, calculated as a result of a single 
model run. Our criteria for selecting rules for inclusion in this comparative assessment 
were mainly the popularity of the rule and its simplicity. 
4.1 Assumptions and methods used for quantitative analysis of three 
selected burden sharing rules 
The geographical basis for our calculations were 67 countries (see Table 5). All other 
countries were aggregated into one region, called ROW-67.  This disaggregation was 
chosen so as to permit the calculation of emission limits for the nine world regions of 
the MERGE model (Manne and Richels, 2001) either directly or by simple aggregation.  
In particular, MERGE’s ROW region is identical with our ROW-67 (Klaassen et al., 
2003).  
The global CO2 emission target used in our calculations was taken from the B2-550KP 
scenario generated by MERGE (based on an emulation of the IIASA-SRES B2 scenario 
formulated by IIASA’s MESSAGE model). The B2-550KP scenario stabilizes CO2 
concentrations at a level of 550 parts per million by volume in 2100 (Figure 1).  It also 
assumes that countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol achieve their respective targets 
(Klaassen et al., 2003).5  
                                               
5
 More specifically, we calculated the emissions in 2010 with the following assumptions: for the USA the 
emissions would be 1.725 GtC (with the USA following domestic policy, as calculated by Kydes, 2002); 
the sum of emissions of WEU, Japan, and CANZ (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) would be 1.573 
GtC; and the emission for EEFSU (Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union) to be less than 1.1 GtC.  For 
detailed description (see Klaassen et al., 2003). 
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Figure 1: Global CO2 emission target, taken from a run of the MERGE model including 
a 550 ppmv constraint on atmospheric GHG concentrations and the emission limits 
prescribed in the Kyoto Protocol (except for the USA)  For comparison, business-as-
usual (BAU) emissions are added (upper line). 
This global total was then distributed to the 67 countries and ROW-67 using the 
following three rules as a basis, one at a time: 
(1)  Equal emissions per capita; 
(2)  Carbon-intensity approach;  
(3)  Triptych. 
To make the three approaches applicable to all countries of the world and to use them to 
distribute the global target of global CO2 emission trajectory, we had to slightly modify 
rules (2) and (3).  
For all three approaches, we calculated emission entitlements for different time periods 
for different countries. For countries with a 2010 emission limit under the Kyoto 
Protocol, we used this as their emission entitlement for the year 2010 and applied our 
rules thereafter. For the USA, emissions for 2010 are taken as specified in footnote 5 
and our rules applied from then onwards. For all other countries, the period for 
calculating emission entitlements according to the three rules begins in 2015. In all 
cases, emission entitlements are calculated at 5-year intervals.  
In order to avoid drastic breaks of past emission trends in the calculated time trajectories 
of the emission entitlements, we chose the year 2050 as the target year for complying 
with the spirit of the respective rule. For rule (1), equal emission rights per person, this 
means, e. g., that the total emission entitlements of a country become proportional to the 
country’s population (of that year) only in 2050.  
As the variable to be used for smoothing the transition between a country’s shares in 
global emissions in the initial year (1990 or 2010 respectively) and those allocated in 
the end year of our calculations (2050), we amended a method proposed by Global 
Commons Institute (2003) for calculating shares of emissions. For the calculation of 
intermediate-year shares for the equal emissions per capita and equal emissions per 
GDP (carbon intensity) rules, we use the following formula  
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SY+1= SY-(SY-PY+1)t  (Eq. 6)
Where SY is the emission share of a country in year Y, PY is its share of global 
population or global GDP respectively in year Y, t is the fractional time elapsed 
between the starting year (in Annex-B countries 2010, in non-Annex-B countries 1990) 
and 2050 (target year), i.e., t=0 for starting year and t=1 at the target year. The 
advantage of this method is that the shares always add up to the global total and 
therefore to the global target.  (This would not be the case if we used simple linear 
interpolation between the values in starting year and end year, which would necessitate 
the use of correction factors to scale down or up to the global total.) 
Before presenting the numerical results of applying the three rules in Section 4.2, we 
summarize, in the following subsection, the numerical assumptions used in the 
calculations. 
4.1.1 Equal emissions per capita 
We first calculate carbon emission entitlements in 2050 by dividing global carbon 
emissions according to our trajectory by global population as projected by the United 
Nations Population Division (1998). (We illustrate this population projection for 
selected countries and world regions in Figure 2.) We then calculated emission 
allowances for 67 countries and ROW-67 in a straightforward way, that is, by 
multiplying per capita emission entitlements with the respective population.  
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Figure 2: Population development, UN middle-growth case, for 9 selected countries and 
ROW-67, million people. Numbers in the figures refer to the average annual growth rate 
in percentage terms between 1990 and 2050. 
The original projection is defined for the time up to 2050. In that year, China and India 
have approximately 1.5 billion inhabitants each. The biggest population in that year, 
however, is in the aggregated ROW-67 region, which is projected to be home to 4.5 
billion people or 50% of the world population. Total global population eventually 
saturates and remains below 10 billion. 
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4.1.2 The carbon-intensity approach 
The original carbon-intensity approach as proposed by Rowlands (1997) and the 
efficiency-index approach as proposed by Gupta and Bhandari (1999) which uses it, are 
defined for emission reductions only.  We therefore slightly amended it to also cover the 
possibility of increasing entitlements, at the same time trying to retain its spirit, which 
we understand as avoiding punishment for efforts toward efficiency made in the past. 
Our version thus uses the carbon intensity of GDP to calculate a country’s emission 
entitlement. Again we used 2050 as the year in which emission entitlements are 
calculated in full consistency with the rule; that is, carbon emission entitlements per 
GDP in that year are the same for all countries.  For intermediate years (2015, 2020, 
2030, and 2040), emission entitlements are again calculated with equation (6). 
The future values of GDP for all individual countries are derived by multiplying the 
actual GDP value of a country in 1990 with the GDP growth rates that our MERGE B2 
scenario projects for one of the nine MERGE world regions to which the country 
belongs.  GDP values in 1990 for each country were taken from the United Nations 
Systems of National Account (United Nations, various years).  The resulting GDP 
values for the nine MERGE world regions are summarized in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: GDP assumptions in MERGE B2, for nine world regions, trillion (1012) US 
dollars (1990 prices), and average annual growth rates between 1990 and 2050.  
Here, global GDP in 2050 is assumed to reach 120 trillion (1012) US dollars (1990 
prices), which corresponds to a global average annual growth rate between 1990 and 
2050 of 2.8%. The growth is significantly higher than this global average for developing 
regions such as China (6.1%) and India (5.8%). 
4.1.3 Triptych 
As we described in Subsection 3.2.2 above, the original Triptych approach calculates 
emission entitlements as the sum of emission entitlements for three energy-demand 
sectors: electricity generation, heavy industry, and a so-called domestic sector 
(residential and commercial sectors plus other industry sectors including light industry 
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and service industry). Calculating entitlements for the three sectors separately allows 
several country-specific characteristics to be taken into account. 
However, introducing the same set of country-specific circumstances as in the original 
approach into the calculation for all countries and regions of the world would make it 
impractical to try to specify all the necessary parameters (which are fairly uncertain 
anyway), and, as a consequence, the transparency of the calculations would be in 
jeopardy. We therefore simplified the Triptych approach, retaining from the original 
idea that emission entitlements should take account of the economic structure of an 
economy in terms of three aggregated sectors.   
Because of data limitations, we could not separate light and heavy industry.  We 
therefore included all manufacturing sectors in the industry sector.  The global emission 
target for the electricity generation sector is again given by the emissions of the power 
sector in the MERGE B2-550 stabilization scenario. For the industry and the domestic 
sectors, MERGE does not calculate the CO2 emissions separately.  Thus we took the 
shares of industry and the domestic sector in nonelectric carbon emissions as calculated 
in the B2-550 stabilization scenario generated by the MESSAGE model (Riahi and 
Roehrl, 2000). Multiplying these shares by the nonelectric global carbon emissions 
calculated in the MERGE B2-550 scenario, we obtained the global carbon emission 
target for industry and the domestic sector.  Figure 4 shows the resulting global 
emission targets for the three sectors. 
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Figure 4: Global emission targets for the power, industry, and domestic sectors, million 
tons of carbon (MtC). 
For the emission targets for the power sectors of each country we first calculated total 
electricity production in that country by using the region-specific growth rates for 
electricity production, taken from the MERGE B2 scenario (Klaassen et al., 2003). We 
did not account for differences in future fuel mixes because this information is difficult 
to obtain for the countries we used. Instead, we calculated emission entitlements 
assuming that the carbon intensity of total power generation (CO2 emissions per 
kilowatt-hour) would decrease at the same rate for all regions.   
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We calculated the rates such that the total emission entitlements of all world regions for 
the electricity sector correctly add up to the emission entitlement given for the global 
electricity sector (as explained above). The resulting carbon intensity targets of the 
electricity sector for the periods 1990-2010, 2010-2015, 2015-2020, 2020-2030, 2030-
2040, and 2040-2050 are summarized in Table 2.   
Table 2: Carbon intensity targets for the electricity sector, all world regions. 
 1990 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Carbon intensity target (index) 1.00 0.80 0.74 0.63 0.61 0.58 
 
For the industry sector, we again calculated identical annual reduction rates of carbon 
intensity for all countries and regions in a way that matches the global emission 
entitlement described above for the industry sector (see Table 3). Because of limitations 
in data availability, we were not able to separate light and heavy industry.  
Table 3: Carbon intensity targets for the industry sector, all world regions. 
 1990 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Carbon intensity target (index) 1.00 0.35 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.04 
 
For the domestic sector, we followed the original Triptych approach. In other words, we 
calculated emission entitlements in the domestic sector using the rule of converging 
emissions per capita.  
The following data were used for the calculation of our modified Triptych approach.  
The electricity generation of each country for 1990 was taken from IEA’s Energy 
Balance (IEA, 2002).  The future electricity output of a country was calculated using the 
country’s 1990 value multiplied by its growth rate given by the MERGE model 
(B2 scenario) for the world region to which the country belongs.   
Data on the industrial output of each country for 1990 were taken from the International 
Industrial Statistics of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) (UNIDO, 2000).  Future values of industrial output per country were 
calculated in a similar way to electricity output; we took the 1990 value of each country 
and applied identical rates for all countries belonging to one MERGE world region.   
The regional growth rates of industrial output were approximated by the growth rate of 
value added of the industrial sector (GDP from industry), which was calculated by 
multiplying GDP (taken from the MERGE B2 scenario) by the GDP share of industry of 
Scenario B, IIASA-WEC (Nakićenović et al., 1998).  
For calculating targets in the domestic sector, future population assumptions were used 
as described under the equal emissions per capita approach.  The numerical values of 
these variables are summarized in Table 4.   
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Table 4: Assumptions used in the calculations of the sectoral emission entitlements 
under the Triptych approach. 
 USA WEU Japan CANZ EEFSU China India MOPEC ROW-67 
Industrial output (billion US$) and CO2 intensity in the industry sector    
Industrial output in 1990  2861 4005 2246 448 818 350 141 220 797 
CO2 intensity in 1990 (gC/$) 60.3 40.8 30.4 91.5 333.3 783.2 372.1 326.6 308.2 
Industrial output          
A.A.G.R., 1990-2020 1.93 1.51 0.85 1.74 0.91 9.84 6.53 4.32 5.48 
A.A.G.R., 2020-2050 0.58 0.48 0.69 2.04 2.50 2.13 3.35 2.90 2.01 
Industrial output in 2050 6282 7180 3051 896 3773 26822 8002 4105 15682 
CO2 intensity in 2050 (gC/$) 2.4 1.7 1.2 3.7 13.5 31.8 15.1 13.3 12.5 
Electricity generation (TWh) and CO2 in the power sector   
Electricity in 1990 3182 2322 851 669 2157 621 289 418 1311 
CO2 intensity in 1990 (gC/kWh) 154.7 110.9 92.3 96.7 237.3 261.6 193.1 168.1 76.8 
Electricity          
A.A.G.R., 1990-2020 1.43 2.17 1.66 2.12 1.59 4.92 3.61 5.09 4.24 
A.A.G.R., 2020-2050 1.01 1.06 0.32 1.03 1.75 1.43 2.92 2.90 2.46 
Electricity in 2050 6737 6266 1537 1746 6213 4355 2311 5196 10753 
CO2 intensity in 2050 (gC/kWh) 90.2 64.7 53.8 56.4 138.3 152.5 112.6 98.0 44.8 
POP (million) and CO2  per capita in the domestic sector    
Population in 1990 254 377 124 48 410 1155 851 272 1792 
CO2 per capita in 1990, kgC  2705 1351 989 2183 1348 156 53 634 166 
CO2 per capita           
A.A.G.R., 1990-2020 -3.4 -1.9 -1.3 -3.2 -1.9 3.4 6.8 -0.9 -3.4 
A.A.G.R., 2020-2050 -2.2 -1.3 -0.9 -1.6 -1.3 0.6 0.8 0.2 -2.2 
Population in 2050 349 343 105 73 386 1478 1529 613 4490 
CO2 per capita in 2050, kgC  515 515 515 515 515 515 515 515 515 
 
Regarding country-specific CO2 emissions in 1990, the shares of CO2 emissions by 
three sectors are taken from the IEA (IEA, 2000). By multiplying them by the national 
CO2 emissions for each country6, we calculated CO2 emissions from three sectors for 
1990. Figure 5 illustrates the shares of CO2 emissions by the three sectors in 1990. 
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Figure 5: Shares of CO2 emissions in three sectors in 1990 for each MERGE world 
region, in percent.  
                                               
6
 Data were taken from the CO2 database compiled by Marland et al. (2001), and 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1: UNFCCC, 1998. 
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Table 5 summarizes the emission entitlements according to the three burden-sharing 
rules for the 67 countries of our study and for ROW-67.  In the next subsection, we 
discuss the results for selected countries.  
Table 5: Summary of emission entitlement for 67 countries and ROW-67, calculated 
with three burden-sharing rules, MtC. 
1990 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050  
  EPC CI TRIP EPC CI TRIP EPC CI TRIP EPC CI TRIP 
USA               
USA 1352 1725 1312 2040 928 883 1899 829 531 1666 847 377 1313 802 
WEU               
Austria 16 15 13 27 11 11 34 10 10 35 10 8 28 9 
Belgium 31 29 23 42 20 18 46 17 13 44 17 10 34 15 
Denmark 14 13 11 23 14 9 28 13 7 28 14 5 22 13 
Finland 15 14 11 24 11 9 29 10 7 29 10 5 23 9 
France 100 92 86 188 60 79 243 51 73 258 49 65 207 43 
Germany 276 254 206 366 211 153 395 191 106 376 193 79 289 182 
Greece 22 21 18 25 23 15 23 22 12 20 23 9 14 21 
Iceland 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Ireland 8 8 7 11 7 6 11 7 6 10 7 5 8 7 
Italy 117 108 94 191 89 77 233 79 59 239 77 44 189 71 
Luxembourg 3 3 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 0 2 0 
Netherlands 46 42 35 61 32 27 67 28 20 64 28 15 49 25 
Norway 10 10 9 19 5 7 24 4 6 25 3 5 20 3 
Port 11 11 11 15 12 11 16 11 10 16 12 9 12 11 
Spain 71 65 59 100 59 51 112 55 42 109 55 33 85 50 
Sweden 17 15 14 34 11 12 46 9 11 49 9 9 40 8 
Swiss 12 11 10 30 6 10 43 5 9 48 5 7 40 4 
UK 159 147 124 212 133 98 230 124 76 219 127 61 169 121 
JAPAN               
Japan 269 253 221 456 195 182 551 167 143 557 160 113 434 140 
CANZ               
Canada 125 117 95 156 80 72 158 69 54 147 71 46 116 65 
Australia 79 85 67 101 72 49 93 69 34 79 74 28 60 70 
New Zealand 7 7 7 10 5 6 11 5 6 11 5 6 9 4 
EEFSU               
Albania 2 -- 3 2 2 4 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1 -- 3 2 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 3 
Bulgaria 23 21 17 19 16 13 13 17 9 9 18 6 9 18 
Croatia 5 4 5 5 4 5 6 4 5 8 4 4 10 4 
Czech 
Republic 
46 43 33 38 30 23 25 29 13 16 32 8 14 32 
Yugoslavia 13 0 14 12 16 13 10 18 13 10 20 11 11 21 
Hungary 20 18 16 18 15 13 14 14 10 14 15 8 15 15 
Poland 113 106 88 92 87 68 58 86 50 32 94 39 24 96 
Romania 47 43 37 38 36 30 26 37 23 17 41 18 16 41 
Slovakia 16 15 12 13 9 9 9 8 7 7 8 5 6 8 
Slovenia 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 3 2 6 3 2 7 3 
Armenia 1 -- 3 3 2 4 3 3 4 5 3 4 6 3 
Azerbaijan 15 -- 14 12 13 12 10 13 12 9 15 11 9 15 
Belarus 29 -- 23 27 22 17 23 22 12 24 24 9 26 24 
Estonia 10 10 7 9 10 4 6 11 2 5 12 1 5 13 
Georgia 5 -- 6 6 4 6 6 4 6 8 4 6 9 4 
Kazakhstan 78 -- 55 61 57 39 42 57 26 30 65 20 29 66 
Kyrgyzstan 3 -- 5 4 4 6 4 5 7 4 6 8 5 6 
Latvia 6 6 5 6 5 4 6 4 2 7 5 2 8 5 
Lithuania 6 5 5 6 5 4 6 5 4 7 5 3 8 5 
Moldova 6 -- 6 7 6 6 6 6 5 7 7 5 8 7 
Russia 651 652 504 606 477 343 456 469 203 387 520 131 397 530 
Tajikistan 6 -- 8 6 7 9 5 8 11 5 10 12 5 10 
Turkmenistan 9 -- 8 7 8 8 5 8 8 5 10 8 5 10 
Ukraine 186 164 131 153 120 94 116 116 61 100 126 42 103 126 
Uzbekistan 35 -- 38 29 33 39 22 35 43 19 40 44 20 41 
CHINA               
China 617 -- 1214 800 2128 1441 945 2266 1648 1173 2321 1593 1261 2277 
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INDIA               
India 153 -- 828 227 702 1173 315 889 1542 552 1080 1648 817 1168 
MOPEC               
Mexico 84 -- 120 122 139 136 136 161 156 187 201 158 250 227 
Bahrain 3 -- 2 3 4 2 3 5 1 3 6 1 4 7 
Iran 49 -- 78 166 79 94 234 93 116 370 116 124 511 130 
Iraq 11 -- 27 21 25 38 26 32 52 38 41 59 52 46 
Israel 8 -- 9 19 18 9 25 22 10 38 29 10 52 35 
Jordan 2 -- 7 3 6 11 2 8 15 3 10 18 4 12 
Kuwait 10 -- 7 11 14 5 11 15 4 14 20 4 18 24 
Lebanon 2 -- 4 2 5 4 2 6 5 2 8 6 3 9 
Oman 3 -- 4 5 5 5 6 7 7 8 9 9 11 11 
Qatar 3 -- 2 4 4 2 4 4 1 5 5 1 7 6 
Saudi 81 -- 66 75 93 58 63 104 57 65 133 59 79 159 
Syria 8 -- 18 11 17 25 13 20 33 17 26 37 23 29 
Turkey 35 -- 69 61 70 85 73 83 104 106 103 109 143 114 
UAE 14 -- 10 18 22 7 19 25 5 24 32 4 32 39 
Yemen 2 -- 19 5 14 33 6 21 52 9 29 63 12 32 
ROW-67 644 -- 2158 1260 1809 3091 1723 2264 4257 2455 2787 4841 2897 2990 
Global Total 5827 -- 8133 8133 8133 8787 8787 8787 9847 9847 9847 10099 10099 10099 
 
4.2 Results for nine major countries and ROW-67 
In this subsection, we present and briefly characterize the results of each of the three 
approaches for nine representative countries (USA, Germany, Japan, Canada, Poland, 
Russia, China, India, and Mexico) as well as for ROW-67. In the following Section 5, 
we analyze these results comparatively. 
In 1990, CO2 emissions differed significantly in the selected countries. The biggest CO2 
emitter was the USA, emitting 1350 MtC, followed by Russia, ROW-67 and China, 
each emitting more than 600 MtC; Germany and Japan each emitted about 270 MtC; 
India, Canada, Poland each emitted between 110-150 MtC.   
According to the MERGE B2 baseline (that is, unmitigated) scenario, this ranking will 
have changed significantly by the year 2050. Then, the biggest emitter will be ROW-67, 
emitting 3.4 GtC.  The USA will continue to be a big emitter, with 2.2 GtC.  It is 
followed by China, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) and Mexico 
and OPEC (MOPEC), emitting 1.6 GtC, 1.3 GtC, and 1.0 GtC respectively.  Japan will 
emit less than the 1990 value, 225 MtC.  The increase in emissions from Western 
Europe by 2050 compared to 1990 is rather small, i.e., 1000 MtC in comparison to 
929 MtC in 1990.   
4.2.1 Equal emissions per capita 
Figure 6 shows the developments of emission entitlements for nine major countries and 
ROW-67 under the equal emissions per capita approach.  The emission entitlements 
according to this approach represent a radical break with present trends of CO2 
emissions in the industrialized regions.  Although this is not a surprising result, given 
the current carbon emissions and the forecast population distribution, it is still worth 
noting that this burden-sharing rule imposes a severe emission reduction requirement on 
the five OECD countries and Russia, even though our convergence year (2050) was 
assumed to be quite late compared with convergence years used by other authors. (One 
popular convergence year is 2030.) 
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Figure 6: Equal emissions per capita approach: Emission entitlements for nine countries 
and ROW-67 (upper) and enlarged figure (lower), MtC. 
Under the equal emissions per capita approach, three of the nine countries included in 
this comparison (China, India, Mexico) and ROW-67 are allowed to increase their 
carbon emissions, but all other countries of this selection are not allowed to increase 
emissions beyond the 1990 level (or, in the case of Annex B countries, the 2010 level). 
This rule particularly favors India and ROW-67, where high population growth is 
expected (see the population development illustrated in Figure 2).  By 2050, India 
receives the biggest increase (by a factor of more than 10) in emission allowances 
compared to 1990.  ROW-67 obtains an increase by a factor of 7.5. China and Mexico 
obtain comparatively modest increases (factors of 2.6 and 1.9 respectively relative to 
their 1990 emissions).  Although Mexico is expected to have rather high population 
growth, it is interesting to note that the other two rules allocate a larger emission 
entitlement for Mexico.   
In sharp contrast, the USA and Germany face entitlements corresponding to reductions 
of more than 70% compared to their 1990 levels. Canada and Poland also faced severe 
reduction requirements, that is, by almost two-thirds from 1990 levels in 2050.  By the 
same year, Japan is entitled to no more than half of its 1990 emissions.  The most 
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radical reduction assignment is calculated for Russia which would be allowed to emit 
only 20% of its 1990 CO2 emissions in 2050. 
4.2.2 Carbon-intensity approach 
Figure 7 presents the emission entitlements calculated with the modified carbon 
intensity approach.  Under this approach, Japan and Germany are allowed to actually 
increase their emissions in 2050 compared to 1990.  Three developing countries and 
ROW-67 are likewise allowed to increase their emissions substantially, reflecting the 
higher GDP growth assumed for these countries.   
The USA and Canada would be required to reduce their emissions in 2050 by 3% and 
7% respectively, also compared with 1990. The USA would be allowed to increase 
emissions until 2020 although the USA target for 2050 is below the 1990 level. Bigger 
reductions would be required for Canada, but the general picture of Canada’s emission 
entitlements is similar to that of the USA. 
India’s entitlements increase by a factor of more than five, and her emission allowance 
increases gradually over time.  Entitlements for ROW-67 increase similarly to those of 
India. The biggest emission reduction commitment is allocated to Poland and Russia by 
2050.  Their entitlements in 2050 are only 20% (Poland) and 60% (Russia) of their 
respective 1990 levels.  
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Figure 7: Carbon intensity approach: Emission entitlements for nine countries and 
ROW-67, (upper) and enlarged (lower), MtC. 
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The global emission entitlement per GDP in the year 2050 is calculated at 84 gC per 
US dollar (Table 7) using the GDP growth assumption adopted here. Although the 
carbon intensity approach gives equal entitlements in terms of carbon emission per GDP 
for all countries, the reduction rate of the carbon intensity differs from country to 
country, reflecting the differences in the 1990 level.  For example, the 84 gC target for 
Japan implies only an 8% reduction of the 1990 carbon intensity whereas for China, the 
same target amounts to a 95% reduction.  Reduction rates for Poland (96%) and Russia 
(88%) are also particularly high.  Table 6 summarizes the percentage of the emission 
entitlement per GDP in 2050 of the selected countries compared with their 1990 levels.  
Table 6: Percentage of the emission entitlement per GDP in 2050 compared with 1990 
emission level per GDP. 
USA Germany Japan Canada Poland Russia China India Mexico ROW-67 
34.3 50.6 92.3 38.4 4.4 12.4 5.3 16.7 26.1 30.4 
 
4.2.3 A modified Triptych approach 
Figure 8 shows the emission entitlements under our modified Triptych approach. For 
most of the regions except Poland, Russia and China, whose energy intensities were 
particularly high in 1990, the distributions of the entitlements were somewhat in 
between the other two approaches.  All developed countries are allocated emission 
allowances below their 1990 emissions.   
China receives the biggest emission entitlements both during the intermediate years and 
at the end year under this rule. Poland and Russia also have to reduce (16% and 19% 
respectively). 
Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 show emission entitlements calculated for each 
country for electricity generation, industry, and the domestic sector, respectively. For 
the electricity sector (Figure 9), all countries receive CO2 emission entitlements that 
increase compared to their 1990 emissions from this sector.   
For developed countries, the emission allowance calculated for the electricity sector is 
the main source of emission entitlements.  For example, Russia’s allowance from this 
sector is 85% of the country’s total.   
For developing countries, emission entitlements for this sector increase significantly 
compared with 1990 emission levels. In particular, Mexico sees a significant increase in 
its entitlements compared with its 1990 emissions.  In contrast, emission entitlements 
calculated for the industrial sector (Figure 10) show different pictures for developed and 
developing countries.  Emission entitlements for four developed countries (Canada, 
Germany, Japan, and USA) in 2050 are calculated to be as low as between 6% and 9% 
of the level of their sectoral emissions in 1990.  For Russia and Poland they are 20% 
and for Mexico and ROW-67, 80%.  India and China receive very high emission 
entitlements for this sector compared with their 1990 levels (210% increase for China 
and 130% increase for India).  For China in particular, the industry sector accounts for 
37% of the national entitlement, a much higher percentage of the industry sector than 
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that of other countries.  Big differences in the reduction rates among countries are due 
partly to the difference in the industrial output growth rate, but mainly to allowed CO2 
intensity differences among countries (see Table 4).  For example, for China, the target 
CO2 intensity in 2050 is approximately the 1990 Japan level.  In 2050, the difference in 
target CO2 intensity between Japan and China is a factor of about 25.    
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Figure 8: Modified Triptych approach: Emission entitlements for nine countries and 
ROW-67 (upper) and detail (lower), MtC. 
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Figure 9: Modified Triptych approach, emission targets calculated for the electricity 
sector, in MtC. Percentages at the right refer to the share of power sector entitlements in 
the respective country total in 2050. 
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Figure 10: Modified Triptych approach, emission targets calculated for the industry 
sector, MtC. Percentages at the right refer to the share of the industry sector in national 
emission entitlements.  
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Figure 11: Modified Triptych approach, emission target calculated for domestic sector, 
MtC. The percentages on the right-hand side refer to the share of the domestic sector in 
the respective country total.  
The global emission target for the domestic sector is the highest of the three sectors 
(recall Figure 4). As a consequence of the rule adopted for this sector, the resulting 
distribution of the emission entitlements to countries looks somewhat similar to those 
resulting from the equal emissions per capita approach (Figure 6). Developed countries, 
as well as transition countries, receive entitlements amounting to 22%-44% of their 
1990 emission levels.  India, ROW-67, and China in 2050 are allocated 764%, 464%, 
and 369% respectively of their 1990 emissions. 
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5 Comparing the Three Burden-sharing Rules from an Equity 
Perspective 
In this section, we compare the emission entitlements according to the three selected 
rules and assess their equity implications.  As we have argued above in Section 2, 
egalitarian equity can be related to per capita emission entitlement, and the emission 
entitlement per GDP can serve as an indicator of horizontal equity.  Emission 
entitlements in terms of percentage change relative to 1990 reflect proportional 
equality.  
We therefore base the following comparison of emission entitlements according to the 
three selected burden-sharing rules (equal entitlements per capita, equal entitlements per 
GDP, and Triptych) one at a time on the three indicators: (i) entitlements relative to 
1990 emission; (ii) per capita entitlement; and (iii) entitlement per unit of GDP.  To 
keep this comparison within reasonable limits, we restrict ourselves to nine typical 
countries and to the largest world region, ROW-76. We add graphical illustrations using 
the three indicators here.  In order to avoid too much duplication we provide in the 
appendix a four-part table (Table 7) with absolute entitlements (in MtC) and 
entitlements expressed with the three indicators. 
5.1 Calculated carbon emission entitlements and egalitarian equity 
Because of the one-to-one correspondence between the egalitarian equity and the 
emissions per capita indicator, it seems obvious to begin the comparison with this 
indicator. We shall therefore look at Figure 12, which shows the entitlements per capita 
according to all three rules. The corresponding numerical values are given in Table 7(c). 
In 1990, average global CO2 emissions were 1.1 tC per person, with India (0.2 tC) on 
the low end and the USA (5.3 tC) on the high end of the 9 selected countries and ROW-
67. All developing countries were below the global average level in 1990.  To 
grandfather these would obviously not be equitable under the egalitarian principle.   
The global per capita emission entitlement in 2050 is 1.08 tC per year under the 
assumptions on population growth and carbon emissions adopted here. The largest 
deviation from this value is for India under the carbon intensity rule (0.53 tC). On the 
high side, the largest deviation is for Russia under Triptych with 4.4 tC. 
Before 2050, the per capita emission entitlements of India and ROW-67 remain below 
the global average level under all three rules. The carbon intensity rule gives a wider 
range of emission entitlements per capita than the Triptych approach.  The ratio between 
the highest and the lowest emission entitlements under the Triptych rule in 2050 is 3.9, 
but this excludes Russia, whose entitlement comes out rather high (at 4.4 tC per capita): 
the result of higher emission entitlements allocated to the electricity sector. 
 27
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
USA
Germany
Japan
Canada
Poland
Russia
China
India
Mexico
ROW67
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
USA Germany
Japan Canada
Poland Russia
China India
Mexico ROW
 
Figure 12: Comparing emission entitlements per capita, in tC per year per capita. 
Entitlements under the equal emissions per capita rule, the carbon intensity approach, 
and the modified Triptych approach from top to bottom for 10 countries and regions). 
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5.2 Calculated carbon emission entitlements and horizontal equity 
As we mentioned above, equal carbon emission entitlements reflect the horizontal-
equity principle, which postulates an equal burden for all. How well this principle is 
reflected by the carbon-intensity indicator can be discussed, but we believe that 
expressing emission entitlements relative to GDP allows horizontal equity to be 
discussed as fully as it can be within the scope of this paper. We therefore present, in 
Figure 13, the entitlements per unit of GDP according to all three rules. The 
corresponding numerical values are given in Table 7 (d). 
In 1990, the average global carbon intensity of GDP was of the order of 256 tons of 
carbon (tC) per million US dollars. Perhaps it would be more indicative to say 256 
grams of carbon per US dollar (gC/US$). Of the nine countries and ROW-67, which we 
selected for this comparison, Japan was the most carbon-efficient (with 91 gC/US$), 
followed by Germany (165 gC/US$), Canada (218 gC/US$), and the USA 
(243 gC/US$). Poland and China had by far the highest CO2 emission per GDP 
(1919 and 1692 gC/US$ respectively). Russia, India, Mexico also had rather high 
carbon intensities of GDP in 1990 (674, 500, and 320 gC/US$ respectively). ROW-67 
emissions per unit of GDP were not much bigger than those of the USA (275 gC/US$).  
Under the assumptions on economic growth and carbon emissions adopted here, the 
aggregate global carbon emission entitlement per unit of GDP in the year 2050 is 
83.6 gC/US$. This value determines the carbon emission entitlements under the carbon 
intensity rule in 2050 for all countries and regions by definition, and carbon emission 
entitlements per GDP converge in 2050. 
The second best (after the carbon intensity rule) in terms of horizontal equity – 
expressed as equal carbon intensity of GDP – is the Triptych approach which in 2050 
leads to a factor of 6 between the highest and the lowest carbon intensities of the nine 
countries and ROW-67. For the equal emissions per capita approach, this factor is 8, 
which is still considerably lower than in 1990, when it equaled 20. Still, horizontal 
equity does not score well in either of the other two rules.   
In absolute terms, under the equal emissions per capita rule, the industrialized countries 
USA, Germany, and Japan are allowed carbon intensities not much higher than 
20 gC/US$. For the USA, this value amounts to a reduction by a factor of 10 between 
1990 and 2050, which averages an annual reduction rate of 3.8%? For Japan, which 
began with 91 gC/US$ in 1990, the reduction is relatively smaller, but still implies an 
average annual rate of 2.4%  
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Figure 13: Comparing emission entitlement per GDP, in gC/US$. Entitlements under 
the equal emissions per capita rule, the carbon intensity approach, and the modified 
Triptych approach from top to bottom for 10 countries and regions).  
 30
5.3 Calculated carbon emission entitlements and proportional equality 
As an indicator of proportional equality we now present in Figure 14 the emission 
entitlements according to the three burden-sharing rules relative to actual 1990 
emissions. Let us note here that these are the “units” of reduction used in the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
None of the three rules analyzed here implies similar percentage reductions across all 
countries.  The modified Triptych rule leads to less discrepancy in this indicator 
(measured as the ratio between the highest and lowest numbers), which falls between 
52% (Japan, Canada) and 764% (India) in 2050. Moreover, India has the highest 
entitlements (in terms of 1990 emissions) of the 10 countries and regions under all three 
rules.  
Looking separately at developing and developed regions, we find that, within both, the 
modified Triptych approach results in rather similar reduction rates across developed 
countries (USA, Germany, Japan, Canada, Poland, and Russia) and across developing 
regions (China, India, Mexico and ROW-67).  
The USA, Germany, Japan, and Canada receive either higher or lower emission 
entitlements compared to 1990 depending on the rule.  Under the equal emission per 
capita rule, these countries must reduce their CO2 emission to 30%-40% of their 1990 
levels by 2050.  The carbon intensity approach allows fewer emissions for developing 
countries and more for developed countries compared to the other two approaches, in 
particular during the intermediate years.   
The transition countries Poland and Russia are prescribed particularly strict emission 
reductions compared to 1990 under the equal emissions per capita approach and the 
carbon intensity approach.   
India, China, Mexico, and ROW-67 are allocated increases in CO2 emissions compared 
to 1990 under all three rules. In particular, under the equal emission per capita rule, 
India and ROW-67 are allowed significant increases in CO2 emissions compared to 
1990.  
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Figure 14: Comparing emission entitlements relative to 1990 emissions.  Entitlements 
under the equal emissions per capita rule, the carbon intensity approach, and the 
modified Triptych approach from top to bottom for 10 countries and regions). Units: 
1990=100%. 
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5.4 Comparison from a country perspective  
So far in this section, we have assessed the three burden-sharing rules from an equity 
perspective. In terms of political acceptability, the size of the burden (cost) that is 
inflicted on any country under a given rule will also be an important matter. Although 
here, the maximum permitted carbon intensity can be regarded as an indicator of the 
economic burden implied by a rule, we think that a better approximation of the to-be-
expected burden is the comparison with business-as-usual emissions. 
As we have used the MERGE model for producing a global carbon emission trajectory 
consistent with atmospheric CO2 concentrations that also remain below 550ppmv in the 
long run, we use the same model for a comparison between unconstrained world-
regional emissions and entitlements according to the three rules. Figure 15 show 
cumulative business-as-usual emissions between 1990 and 2050 as well as cumulative 
entitlements according to the three rules.  To emphasize the difference, we also show 
the cumulative entitlements as a fraction of cumulative business-as-usual emissions in 
Figure 16. Using a MERGE scenario naturally means that we carry out this assessment 
for the nine world regions considered by that model. 
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Figure 15: Cumulative CO2 emissions in the business-as-usual (BAU) case and 
cumulative emission entitlements calculated under the three rules, GtC.  
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Figure 16: Cumulative emission entitlements calculated under the three rules as 
fractions of cumulative business-as-usual CO2 emissions.  
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In “post-Kyoto language”, the implementation of any of the three schemes would create 
“hot air”. Curiously perhaps, the carbon intensity rule would allocate more entitlements 
than BAU emissions to one industrialized country, i.e., Japan. This is because emissions 
projected in MERGE for Japan in 2050 are lower than those in 1990. The mirror image 
of this result holds for India, which would be allocated more emissions than needed by 
the other two rules (equal emissions per capita and Triptych). The Triptych approach 
also creates hot air for China, and equal emissions per capita for the ROW region.  
For the countries and regions of the OECD, the carbon intensity rule clearly is the most 
advantageous, and the difference between the other two rules (equal emissions per 
capita and Triptych) is comparatively minor. No such disparity between these two rules 
can be claimed for the developing countries: India and ROW should prefer equal 
emissions per capita, whereas China and MOPEC should prefer Triptych. The carbon 
intensity rule is also clearly the least advantageous for China, India, and ROW. The 
least differences in entitlements have been calculated for the reforming economies 
(EEFSU). All three rules lead to reductions of BAU emissions. The most severe 
reductions are specified by equal emissions per capita, followed by carbon intensity and 
Triptych.  
6 Summary and Conclusions 
Equity and fairness figure explicitly in the UNFCCC, and they must be considered 
important criteria for any future agreements by Parties to the UNFCCC on how jointly 
to avert dangerous human interference with the global climate. Accordingly, several 
authors have presented different equity principles and discussed their implications for 
sharing the burden of global climate mitigation.  
In some cases authors have used equity principles to formulate emission allocation 
rules.  In other studies, rules were proposed first and equity principles were used to 
assess them.  In this connection, it is important to note that equity principles and 
burden-sharing rules do not correspond in a one-to-one manner: one rule may contain 
several aspects of equity and one equity principle can be reflected in different rules at 
the same time. 
For this paper, we first surveyed equity principles and different schemes of allocating 
emission entitlements to countries proposed in the relevant literature and then 
systematically related them to each other. We found that in doing so, it is useful to use 
three concepts as “red threads” to organize the discussion of equity. The first is to 
interpret equity as an equal right for everyone to pollute or, equivalently, to enjoy a 
pollution-free atmosphere (egalitarian equity). This concept leads in a straightforward 
way to a rule that allocates equal emissions to each person. The second concept is that 
of horizontal equity which conceptually aims at an equal distribution of welfare loss due 
to climate mitigation. The third concept is that of proportional equality, which supports 
one of the more popular burden-sharing rules, i.e., proportional cutbacks of base-year 
emissions (grandfathering). 
Another important aspect that complements the three concepts is vertical equity. 
Vertical equity describes the idea of progressive burden allocation, for instance 
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progressively higher taxes imposed on higher incomes. Vertical equity thus takes ability 
to pay into account.   
Mathematically speaking, horizontal equity is a linear concept whereas vertical equity is 
a non linear one. As there are many more nonlinear than linear functions, it is 
understandable that horizontal equity plays a dominant role in those schemes that 
distribute joint emission limits to a number of countries of comparable wealth. Such an 
approach is the Triptych approach, originally proposed for the countries of the European 
Union. Although there, the disparity among countries is smaller than the disparity 
worldwide, provisions were specified to accommodate the special situation of the 
“cohesion” countries – Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Specifying such provisions 
can be seen as adding vertical equity to a horizontally equitable scheme. Attempting to 
follow a similar strategy during the design of global schemes would obviously be a 
major and challenging task. 
Looking at the issue of equal rights to emit and equal percentage reduction of emissions, 
it is plain that the equal emissions per capita rule turns out to be more vertically 
equitable than any version of the grandfathering rule because it puts a greater mitigation 
burden on those countries that emit more and whose ability to pay is greater. 
Suggesting equal permission rights for each person, given its simplicity and its appeal to 
the equity of all individuals, may convince many that this is the most appropriate 
guiding principle for allocating emission rights. Political reality prevents the 
straightforward implementation of this approach, however, because the approach 
implies huge reduction commitments for industrialized and nonbinding commitments to 
developing countries; moreover, the argument for equal burdens will weigh heavily for 
high-emission countries. Would this then mean that political reality will render equity 
principles superfluous? Not at all. In our opinion, it means simply that equity and 
political feasibility can be considered as two conflicting objectives, and that each 
proposed scheme of burden sharing will be evaluated in terms of both. Let us also note 
that public acceptance of any rule also depends on how equitable it is perceived to be. 
Conflicting objectives were of course well-known even before climate change was on 
the international political agenda. One problem with equity, however, is that it is 
difficult to measure unambiguously – if it is possible at all. This ambiguity may be 
considered analytically more difficult, but, at the same time, it also presents an 
opportunity for international negotiations because, at least conceivably, equity 
principles can be combined to lead to many different outcomes in terms of emission 
allocations. This possibility of “bundling” equity principles quite naturally increases the 
number of possible agreements and therefore the likelihood of international negotiators 
agreeing on a set of equity principles that lead to politically feasible agreements of 
global burden sharing. 
This paper gives an indication of the ranges of emission entitlements that could be 
supported by different equity principles. No attempt was made here to propose a 
“compromise” that attempts to balance the arguments for and against each principle. 
That would, in our opinion, not only be futile, but also interfere unduly with the job of 
international negotiators. We regarded it as our job to do the analysis and as the 
negotiators’ job to do the assessment in terms of political reality.  
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Appendix 
Table 7. Summary of indicators related to emission entitlement for 10 countries and 
region based on three principles. 
(a) Emission entitlement (MtC)
1990
EPC CI TRIP EPC CI TRIP
USA 1352 1312 2040 928 377 1313 802
Germany 276 206 366 211 79 289 182
Japan 269 221 456 195 113 434 140
Canada 125 95 156 80 46 116 65
Poland 113 88 92 87 39 24 96
Russia 651 504 606 477 131 397 530
China 617 1214 800 2128 1593 1261 2277
India 153 828 227 702 1648 817 1168
Mexico 84 120 122 139 158 250 227
ROW-67 644 2158 1260 1809 4841 2897 2990
(b) Emission entitlement in terms of percentage reduction/increase relative to 1990
1990
EPC CI TRIP EPC CI TRIP
USA 100 97 151 69 28 97 59
Germany 100 75 133 76 29 105 66
Japan 100 82 170 73 42 161 52
Canada 100 76 125 64 37 93 52
Poland 100 78 81 77 35 21 84
Russia 100 77 93 73 20 61 81
China 100 197 130 345 258 204 369
India 100 541 148 459 1077 534 764
Mexico 100 143 145 166 188 297 270
ROW 100 335 196 281 752 450 464
(c) Emission entitlement per population (tC per person)
1990
EPC CI TRIP EPC CI TRIP
USA 5.32 4.14 6.43 2.93 1.08 3.76 2.30
Germany 3.48 2.54 4.52 2.60 1.08 3.95 2.48
Japan 2.18 1.79 3.68 1.58 1.08 4.13 1.34
Canada 4.49 2.59 4.24 2.17 1.08 2.74 1.53
Poland 2.97 2.25 2.34 2.20 1.08 0.67 2.64
Russia 4.39 3.58 4.31 3.39 1.08 3.27 4.37
China 0.53 0.83 0.55 1.46 1.08 0.85 1.54
India 0.18 0.65 0.18 0.55 1.08 0.53 0.76
Mexico 1.01 0.96 0.97 1.11 1.08 1.70 1.55
ROW 0.36 0.68 0.40 0.57 1.08 0.65 0.67
(d) Emission entitlement per GDP (tC per million US dollar)
1990
EPC CI TRIP EPC CI TRIP
USA 243.4 115.3 179.3 81.6 24.0 83.6 51.1
Germany 165.2 71.3 126.8 72.9 22.8 83.6 52.5
Japan 90.6 48.6 100.2 42.9 21.8 83.6 27.1
Canada 217.8 87.6 143.7 73.5 32.9 83.6 46.6
Poland 1918.8 1132.5 1181.6 1111.4 135.1 83.6 330.3
Russia 673.5 394.0 474.1 373.2 27.5 83.6 111.7
China 1591.1 243.4 160.4 426.5 105.6 83.6 151.0
India 500.1 531.0 145.5 450.7 168.7 83.6 119.6
Mexico 319.7 164.9 166.6 190.6 53.0 83.6 76.0
ROW 274.6 210.4 122.8 176.4 139.7 83.6 86.3
2020 2050
2020 2050
2020 2050
2020 2050
 
